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Abstract
The federal government's Medicare program did not provide general prescription drug coverage for the first
40 years of its existence. Thus, more than 30 percent of the 44 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries of the
program lacked insurance coverage for prescribed medications. The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 established a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit
known as Medicare Part D. This program took effect in 2006 and represents the largest expansion of an
entitlement program since the start of Medicare itself. The design of Part D is of particular interest to
economists for at least three reasons: First, the program has the potential to affect significantly both the health
and the economic well-being of the more than 44 million individuals currently enrolled in Medicare. Second,
Part D has substantially increased government spending on health care despite the projections that such
spending was already on an unsustainable path. Third, Part D represents an ambitious attempt to use market
mechanisms in the delivery of a large-scale entitlement program. Part D has been controversial. In this paper,
we aim to shed light on the various issues raised by the Part D program, including the incentives inherent in
the competition among plans, the forces that affect drug prices, and the sustainability of Part D in the face of
adverse selection and moral hazard. We conclude that Part D has succeeded in a number of important ways,
however, substantial room for improvement remains.
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Providing Prescription Drug Coverage
to the Elderly: America’s Experiment
with Medicare Part D
Mark Duggan, Patrick Healy,
and Fiona Scott Morton
T he share of U.S. healthcare spending accounted for by prescription drugshas steadily increased since the early 1980s, from 4.5 percent in 1982 to5.6 percent in 1994, with this then rapidly accelerating to 10.1 percent by
2005 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008). However, the federal
government’s Medicare program did not provide prescription drug coverage for
the first 40 years of its existence since its inception in 1966 (with the exception of
drugs administered in hospitals and other institutional settings and for selected
drugs administered in physicians’ offices, primarily those for cancer therapy). Thus,
more than 30 percent of the 44 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries of the
program lacked insurance coverage for prescribed medications and could not
easily afford to pay for them out of pocket (Neuman et al., 2007).
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003 established a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit known as Medi-
care Part D. This program took effect in 2006 and represents the largest expansion
of an entitlement program since the start of Medicare itself. In 2007, Part D covered
24 million beneficiaries and cost the federal government $39 billion, for an average
of $1,600 per individual enrolled. This cost is projected to grow as per capita
healthcare costs continue to outpace GDP growth and as the baby boom generation
ages (Aaron, Lambrew, and Healy, 2008). The Medicare Trustees (2008) estimate
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that by 2015, Part D will cover 34 million Medicare recipients and will have cost the
federal government a cumulative $586 billion.
The design of Part D is of particular interest to economists for at least three
reasons: First, the program has the potential to affect significantly both the health
and the economic well-being of the more than 44 million individuals currently
enrolled in Medicare. Second, Part D has substantially increased government
spending on health care despite the projections that such spending was already on
an unsustainable path. Third, Part D represents an ambitious attempt to use market
mechanisms in the delivery of a large-scale entitlement program. Other federal
prescription drug programs have purchased drugs and dispensed them directly,
like the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs, or employed a formula to determine
the price to pay for each treatment, like Medicaid (Duggan and Scott Morton,
2006). In contrast, Medicare Part D aims to control spending by exposing its
enrollees to the full incremental costs above a benchmark insurance plan, and by
allowing private insurance plans to compete for enrollees by negotiating with drug
manufacturers for lower prices and covering treatments that are valued by Medi-
care recipients. These insurers, operating under substantial federal subsidies and
rules to ensure access, compete for enrollees in one or more regions based on
benefit design, price, and service. Medicare recipients can choose from among
dozens of plans, potentially allowing for a better match on average between
individual preferences and services provided than one uniform program could
achieve.
Because of this design, Part D has been controversial. One set of critics has
argued that the program is a subsidized handout to pharmaceutical firms and that
the government should instead negotiate directly with pharmaceutical manufac-
turers over prices. Another set of critics has complained that the program is too
large and generous and that it creates unnecessary government interference in the
pharmaceutical market. Still other critics claim that the profusion of plans and
options is so complex and confusing that the elderly are unable to understand their
options and make the best choices. In this paper, we aim to shed light on these and
many related issues, including the incentives inherent in the competition among
plans, the forces that affect drug prices, and the sustainability of Part D in the face
of adverse selection and moral hazard.
We conclude that Part D has succeeded in a number of important ways—by on
average reducing pharmaceutical prices, increasing the utilization of prescription
drugs, reducing medical expenditure risk, and costing the government substantially
less than the initial budget projections suggested. However, the results from recent
research suggest that the complexity of the program has resulted in suboptimal
choices by many Medicare recipients and that Part D has increased the price of
treatments without therapeutic substitutes (Kling, Mullainathan, Shafir, Ver-
meulen, and Wrobel, 2008; Duggan and Scott Morton, 2008). Additionally, impor-
tant concerns remain about the high administrative costs of the program and about
the ability of the insurance plans to cream-skim (or to avoid certain types of
70 Journal of Economic Perspectives
patients). Thus while Medicare Part D has certainly been more of a success than its
most vocal opponents predicted, substantial room for improvement remains.
Sponsors of Medicare Part D
A variety of organizations can sponsor Medicare Part D plans: insurance
companies, employers, union organizations, Medicare managed care plans, and
others. Plan sponsors offer one of two broad types of private plans: stand-alone
prescription drug plans that supplement fee-for-service Medicare, and Medicare
Advantage prescription drug plans, in which the drug plan is integrated into the
overall health care provided by a managed care organization.1 Medicare Advantage
plans existed well before the creation of Part D—and in fact some were already
providing prescription drug coverage in 2003. Prescription drug plans are specific
to a region and must be available to a consumer anywhere in the region. There are
34 stand-alone prescription drug plan regions and 26 Medicare Advantage drug
plan regions nationwide (excluding the territories). Medicare Advantage plans
generally define their own service areas offered at a local (county) level rather than
a regional level.
In this article, we focus primarily on stand-alone prescription drug plans. One
reason is that significantly more Medicare recipients are enrolled in them: of the
57 percent of Medicare recipients enrolled in Part D as of June 2008, more than
two-thirds chose stand-alone prescription drug plans. In addition, Medicare Advan-
tage plans are purposefully subsidized more heavily to encourage more Medicare
recipients to enroll in the managed form of the benefit. Given these factors
together with the manner in which Medicare Advantage combines the drug benefit
and a menu of other medical services, quick comparisons of a prescription drug
plan to a Medicare Advantage plan are not especially fruitful.
Sponsors of a stand-alone prescription drug plan must offer a basic plan
consisting of either the government-defined standard benefit or an alternative
“actuarially equivalent” in value (meaning that the average shares of total spending
covered by the plan and the enrollee are equal to those under the standard
benefit). Sponsors can also offer enhanced plans with more coverage, more favor-
able cost sharing, and a more expansive formulary (a list of drugs covered by the
plan with associated cost-sharing rules)—and generally higher premiums.
For 2008, 55 parent firms are sponsoring stand-alone prescription drug plans,
and 1,824 region-specific plans exist, which works out to an average of 33 plans per
1 In an effort to reduce Part D’s crowding out of private insurance coverage, the legislation also
established tax-free subsidies (Medicare benefits are also tax free) to employers who provide prescrip-
tion drug coverage to Medicare recipients that is at least as generous as the standard Part D plan
(“creditable coverage”). The subsidy pays 28 percent of costs incurred by the employers between the
deductible and an upper limit of $5,600 per enrollee in 2008, for a maximum potential subsidy of
$1,491. About 15 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries, or 6.7 million people, received the retiree drug
subsidy in 2008. We will have little to say about this aspect of the program.
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firm and 54 plans for each of the 34 regions. The entry of plans was much greater
than expected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which admin-
isters the benefit. No regions in the United States had fewer than 22 basic plans
offered and 47 plans overall (including Medicare Advantage plans), which creates
a large amount of choice for the typical Medicare recipient.
Enrollment has been highly concentrated in a small number of plans covering
large geographic areas, with 4 percent of the 1,824 plans accounting for more than
half of stand-alone prescription drug plan enrollment in 2008. Firm concentrations
are also impressive, with the top three parent firms insuring 55 percent of total
stand-alone prescription drug plan enrollees in 2008, as shown in Table 1.
The Consumer’s Problem
Every year beginning on November 15, Medicare beneficiaries have the option
to sign up for Part D or to change their current plan, effective January 1 of the next
calendar year. They must remain in their chosen plans for the entire year and
Table 1
Distribution of Stand-alone Prescription Drug Plan Enrollees across
Parent Firms, 2008
Organization
type
Enrollment
(millions)
Market
share
Total 16.42
UnitedHealth Group National 4.05 24.7%
Humana National 3.11 18.9%
Universal American National 1.80 11.0%
Wellpoint National 1.31 8.0%
WellCare Health Plans National 1.00 6.1%
Coventry Health Care National 0.87 5.3%
CVS Caremark National 0.53 3.2%
Health Net National 0.51 3.1%
Longs Drug Stores National 0.45 2.8%
CIGNA National 0.32 2.0%
Health Care Service Local 0.31 1.9%
Aetna National 0.31 1.9%
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota Local 0.30 1.8%
HealthSpring National 0.27 1.6%
Medco Health Solutions National 0.21 1.3%
All Others Both 1.08 6.6%
Source: Authors’ calculations from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, June 2008 Part D
enrollment report, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/EP.
Notes: The table excludes employer-sponsored plans and union plans. National plans serve all 34
stand-alone prescription drug plan regions (excluding territories), while local plans serve fewer than 30
regions.
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cannot switch to a different plan until the following January.2 Sponsors of prescrip-
tion drug plans in each region are required to submit all plan characteristics to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services by the open enrollment period so that
enrollees can make comparisons.
Cost-Sharing Scheme and Incentives
Part D allocates costs between the plan and the enrollee in an unusual way.
Suppose that the enrollee chooses a plan with the statutorily defined standard
benefit and is ineligible for any low-income subsidies. The enrollee pays the
premium for the plan, which in 2008 equals about $32 per month on average. An
enrollee who requires medications will pay 100 percent of the costs until spending
for covered drugs reaches an initial deductible, which is $275 in 2008. After the
enrollee has paid the deductible, the next $2,235 of expenditures are paid 25 per-
cent by the enrollee and 75 percent by the plan until combined spending reaches
the initial coverage limit, $2,510 in 2008. Expenditures above this level and below
$5,726 fall into what has become known as the “doughnut hole,” in which the
enrollee pays 100 percent and the plan pays zero.
An enrollee who spends an average of more than $210 per month on medi-
cations will fall into this region. These payments drive the enrollee’s out-of-pocket
costs up from $834 a year at the start of the doughnut hole, to a maximum of
$4,050, which corresponds to $5,726 in total drug costs. For spending above this
“catastrophic threshold,” the enrollee pays the greater of 5 percent coinsurance, or
copayments of $2.25 per generic or “preferred” brand-name drug (defined further
on) and $5.60 for all others. The government pays 80 percent of the remaining
costs through additional subsidies, while the sponsor of the plan pays 15 percent.
It is important to emphasize that the catastrophic threshold is triggered by the
enrollee’s out-of-pocket spending and that spending on drugs not listed on the plan’s
formulary is not counted. Moreover, if an enrollee purchases an enhanced plan or
additional insurance that reduces out-of-pocket costs, the enrollee must continue
cost sharing until the full out-of-pocket amount of $4,050 has been paid—regard-
less of total costs. In this way, Part D incentives dampen the supply of “gap” coverage,
because such coverage raises the total spending required before reaching the cata-
strophic threshold and therefore makes the enrollee more costly to the insurer.3
While the scheme described above departs from the standard intuition that it
2 There are certain exceptions to this general rule. For example, Medicare recipients residing in a
nursing home or who are also eligible for Medicaid have more opportunities to change plans through
special enrollment periods. Similarly, Medicare recipients who move to a different plan region can
switch to a different plan around the time of their move.
3 To address this issue, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services used its demonstration authority
to allow plans offering gap coverage to receive federal reinsurance in the form of extra monthly
capitated payments per enrollee instead of reimbursement for specific high-cost enrollees. Indeed, the
demonstration seems to be effective as the proportion of enhanced plans offering coverage in the gap
rose from 36 percent in 2006 to 57 percent in 2008. For more information, see Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services’ “Instructions for the Part D Payment Demonstration,” May 10, 2005 (available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DrugCoverageClaimsData/Downloads/partdpymntdemo.pdf).
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is optimal to have steadily more cost sharing as expenditures rise, it is the natural
outcome of a political process that had three constraints: First, policymakers
wanted the program to be popular with a large fraction of Medicare recipients,
even for those who spend very little on drugs. Second, policymakers also wanted the
program to have catastrophic coverage to protect those who have high outlays from
ruinous bills. Finally, the fiscal year 2004 budget resolution capped the bill’s total
cost, and so the “doughnut hole” emerged to keep costs down.
Alternative Plan Design
The benefit structure laid out above is the one defined in the 2003 legislation.
Plans with this structure make up one-quarter of basic plans in 2008 and have a
stand-alone prescription plan market share of 17 percent overall. However, spon-
sors may offer two additional types of basic plans as long as projected average
payments for the enrollee are the same as would be expected under the standard
plan.
The first alternative, called “actuarially equivalent coverage,” might have tiered
copayments in place of the standard 25 percent coinsurance, but all other elements
of the benefit design such as the deductible and initial coverage limit would be the
same as the standard benefit. These plans comprise 26 percent of basic plans for
2008, with a market share of 23 percent overall.
The other alternative, called “basic alternative coverage,” may have a smaller
deductible than the standard plan or no deductible at all, as well as modified cost
sharing. These plans account for more than half of the 2008 basic offerings and
have been the most popular with stand-alone plan enrollees. Nearly two-fifths of
beneficiaries enrolled in basic alternative plans in 2008 with over half of those
persons opting for zero-deductible plans. Table 2 presents the distribution of
enrollees by plan scope, benefit design, and associated design features.
Premium
When Medicare recipients compare plans, the most salient price is likely to be
the monthly premium. Premiums in 2008 range from $9.80 for the cheapest
defined standard plan to $72 and $107.50 for the most expensive basic and
enhanced plans, respectively. It is important to note that the government subsidy
does not depend on the monthly premium, so as not to distort Medicare recipients
toward more generous plans.
To encourage enrollment of healthy people earlier in life, Part D imposes a
permanent increase in premiums for those who enroll later. For each month after
which a beneficiary is eligible for Part D but neither enrolls in the program nor
obtains acceptable alternative coverage, that beneficiary pays an additional 1 per-
cent of the national base beneficiary premium (defined below) for a chosen plan.
Thus, for example, two years of delay would cost the beneficiary an additional 24
percent. This penalty may help to explain the sustained popularity of plans with low
premiums, because some beneficiaries may not expect to need medications in the
upcoming year, as shown in Table 3. However, by enrolling currently, beneficiaries
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Table 2
Characteristics of 2008 Stand-alone Prescription Drug Plans
Plans Enrollment
Number Percent (in millions) Percent
Total 1824 16.42
Organization
National 1564 86% 13.86 84%
Local 260 14% 2.56 16%
Plan type
Defined standard 217 12% 2.76 17%
Actuarially equivalent 232 13% 3.82 23%
Basic alternative 450 25% 6.15 37%
Enhanced 925 51% 3.68 22%
Deductible
Defined standard ($275) 609 33% 7.35 45%
Reduced 150 8% 0.71 4%
Zero 1065 58% 8.36 51%
Gap coverage
Generics and branded 1 0% 0.00 0%
Generics only 528 29% 1.20 7%
None 1295 71% 15.22 93%
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ prescription drug
plan landscape file (available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn) and June 2008
Part D plan enrollment report (available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/EP).
Notes: The table excludes employer-sponsored plans and union plans. National plans serve all 34
prescription drug plan regions (excluding territories). Local plans serve fewer than 30 regions.
Table 3
Average Part D Premiums, Unweighted and Weighted, 2006–2008
Average premiums unweighted
Average premiums weighted
by enrollment
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
All plans $37.43 $36.81 $40.02 $26.04 $27.39 $29.99
Basic coverage $33.11 $28.79 $30.14 $24.16 $24.05 $26.79
Defined standard $25.86 $32.08 $31.77 $15.82 $17.88 $23.90
Actuarially equivalent $33.13 $24.88 $26.18 $28.74 $21.04 $24.72
Basic alternative $35.60 $29.30 $31.39 $26.57 $27.49 $29.37
Enhanced coverage $43.27 $45.66 $49.63 $35.35 $40.42 $41.07
Base beneficiary premium $32.20 $27.35 $27.93
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ prescription drug
plan landscape file (available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn) and plan en-
rollment reports (available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/EP).
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can avoid the penalty on the cost of future premiums and switch to a more
generous plan later when they require medications.
Pharmacy Network and Plan Quality
Plans vary in the pharmacy networks they offer. A “high-quality” plan might have
almost every pharmacy in the region ready to dispense prescriptions. Another might
limit its distribution network to one large chain. Nearly all plans have a mail order
option, and on average, plans offer lower prices for prescriptions delivered by mail.
Enrollees will also evaluate the quality of the administration of the plan. Is it
easy to sign up for? How well does it handle members’ inquiries at its call centers?
Does it carry a trustworthy brand name? At the start of the program, Medicare
recipients had little information on plan quality other than the plan sponsor’s
reputation. There is some suggestive evidence that this mattered at the start of the
program: the lone national AARP plan administered by UnitedHealth Group had
the highest market share (20 percent) in 2006. But beginning with the 2008 open
enrollment period, beneficiaries could access 2007 plan performance ratings via
the “Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder” website. The ratings cover customer
service, the ease of filling prescriptions, and the information provided on drug
coverage and costs. AARP’s 2007 plan performance was deemed “very good” and it
continued to lead the market in 2008.
Price of Medications
Every basic Part D plan is actuarially equivalent in offering an average of $1,676
worth of coverage along with catastrophic coverage beyond the “doughnut hole.”
All else equal, however, a plan with lower drug prices will provide more generous
coverage. The drug prices that plans set are not regulated by the government, so
the price of a “covered” drug can vary substantially across plans. A Medicare
recipient can use the Medicare Plan Finder website for this stage of the choice
process. After entering a zip code, enrollees enter the list of medications they
expect to take in the coming year. The website then displays the estimated annual
cost of medications and premiums, according to the cost-sharing rules of each plan
serving the region. The cost-sharing rules matter. For example, an enrollee who
takes just one inexpensive treatment might have to pay the full cost out of pocket
in a plan with a deductible, while that enrollee might pay only a small fraction or
nothing in a plan with no deductible.
Formularies and Competition among Branded Drugs
Each Part D plan has a formulary, which details the patient’s out-of-pocket cost
for each drug along with the rules the patient or physician must follow to obtain a
drug. All states view a brand-name drug and its FDA-approved generic as sufficiently
close substitutes that they allow a pharmacist to switch between the two without
consulting with a physician. Insurers also view these drugs as very close substitutes,
and the formulary of virtually every plan requires—or creates strong financial
incentives for—an enrollee to purchase a generic when it is available.
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A formulary also defines therapeutic submarkets. Suppose there are several
patented drugs in a therapeutic class, but no generics. These brands may be close
substitutes for one another in the sense that they ameliorate the same problem—
high cholesterol, for example—but they may differ in their side-effects or in other
ways. The prescription drug plan can negotiate with the manufacturers of drugs it
considers very similar to determine which one will offer the best deal for its
enrollees. The plan is well-positioned to take the lead in such negotiations. Patients
will frequently not know enough about clinical pharmacology to evaluate which
drugs are appropriate substitutes for ones they are currently taking. While physi-
cians typically know this, they are uninformed about the prices a prescription drug
plan can negotiate for each drug. Thus, the plan can evaluate tradeoffs between
price and quality that neither the physician nor the Medicare recipient can easily
make. Moreover, because the plan is affecting the consumption of a large group of
consumers, it has the clout to negotiate with a drug manufacturer in a way that an
individual physician or consumer cannot.
A “three-tier” system is the most common way Part D plans organize their
formulary. Generics occupy the lowest tier and have the lowest out-of-pocket
payment. “Preferred brands,” which may have offered a price break to the plan
sponsor, are on tier two with a somewhat higher cost to the enrollee. Brands that
the plan sponsor wants to discourage the use of are on tier three and have the
highest relative out-of-pocket payments. Often, there is a specialty fourth tier
containing very expensive unique and injectable drugs. Additional tools beyond
price that a formulary may use include prior authorization and step therapy. Prior
authorization requires a physician to obtain permission from the plan before
prescribing the drug. Step therapy requires a patient to try a cheaper drug and find
it ineffective before moving to a more expensive one. Lastly, a drug can simply be
off the formulary; the plan does not cover it at all. The purpose of these rules and
price differences is to drive demand toward drugs on the lowest possible tier
(Grabowski and Mullins, 1997).
To develop a sense of how choices between brand-name drugs with different
formulary placement might play out, we analyzed three prominent 2007 stand-
alone prescription drug plans in California: the AARP MedicareRX Saver plan from
UnitedHealth Group, the WellCare Signature Basic Alternative plan, and the Sierra
Rx Basic Alternative plan, which had 21, 9, and 8 percent of the regional market,
respectively. We focused on the 20 top-selling brand-name, cholesterol-reducing
drugs known as statins and established whether they were preferred, nonpreferred,
or off-formulary in these three plans.4 The formulary status and the prices of each
drug vary substantially across plans. In the AARP plan, for example, five of the 20
4 This kind of information is readily available from the Medicare.gov “Plan Finder” website. We collected
this data in May 2007. In order of 2006 sales rank according to the market research firm IMS, the 20
drugs we investigated are Lipitor, Zocor, Zetia, Crestor, Tricor, Pravachol, Niaspan ER, Lescol XL,
Welchol, Lescol, Altoprev ER, Antara, Colestid, Triglide, Lofibra, Mevacor, Lopid, Questran, Prevalite,
and Questran Light.
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drugs were preferred, eight were nonpreferred, and the other seven were off-
formulary. In the WellCare plan, three were preferred, one nonpreferred, and 16
off-formulary. In the Sierra plan, four were preferred, and 16 were off-formulary.
Pricing was consistent with formulary placement, that is, drugs on lower tiers
relative to the other plans were cheaper. There was little overlap between these
plans in formulary placement; for example, only one drug (Zetia) was on the
preferred tier in all three plans. This latter finding suggests that statin manufac-
turers were selective in providing discounts to these plans in exchange for better
(or exclusive) formulary placement.
Tiered cost sharing may not change the total number of prescriptions filled,
but drives demand toward generic and preferred brand drugs. The ability to move
market share between therapeutic substitutes that have market power (for example,
patent protection) allows plans to obtain discounts, reducing the cost per branded
prescription. This mechanism may also allow the plan to benefit consumers by
“guiding” them to cheaper, therapeutically equivalent drugs.
Complexity
Clearly, each Medicare recipient faces a complex task in choosing a prescrip-
tion drug plan. The factors that a Medicare recipient is likely to consider include
the expected out-of-pocket cost of each plan, the formulary status of drugs cur-
rently consumed, and the reputation of the plan sponsor. The dimensionality of the
choice problem rises according to the number of drugs used—the average elderly
person uses five different prescription drugs (Neuman et al., 2007). Moreover, a
forward-looking enrollee would not only consider the coverage of drugs currently
consumed, but also the plan’s formulary breadth given the risk of an adverse health
shock in the future that could lead to additional drugs required.5 The expected
value of a plan’s formulary breadth is a difficult calculation to perform: it requires
knowledge of many drug prices, their associated cost sharing, the likelihood of
different types of health shocks, and the likely effectiveness of each drug for each
health shock.
Behavioral economics research documents that a complicated choice environ-
ment, such as Part D, can easily overwhelm the typical consumer.6 Frank and
Newhouse (2007) believe this complexity has discouraged enrollment and likely led
to suboptimal choices that are not cost effective, especially among poor and
less-educated beneficiaries and those with cognitive impairments. Indeed, 10 per-
cent of eligible beneficiaries both failed to enroll in any Part D plan and had no
5 Recent research by Domino, Stearns, Norton, and Yeh (2008) indicates considerable switching of
drugs among Medicare recipients; thus, focusing only on drugs currently consumed leads to suboptimal
choices.
6 See, for example, an experimental study by Choi, Laibson, and Martin (2008), who find that individ-
uals did not minimize mutual fund administrative costs even though it was in their interest to do so. On
the other hand, recent research by Aguiar and Hurst (2005) indicates that after retirement individuals
have more time than other adults to spend on cost-reducing search. Thus, many Medicare recipients
may have sufficient time to shop for a Part D plan.
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other source of prescription drug coverage in 2008, with a recent study suggesting
that most of this group would benefit from enrollment in Part D (Heiss, McFadden,
and Winter, 2007). Moreover, a recent experimental study by Kling, Mullainathan,
Shafir, Vermeulen, and Wrobel (2008) finds a significant increase in plan switching
when Part D recipients are provided with personalized information on the cost of
alternative plans. Because this information was already publicly available, these
findings suggest that many Medicare recipients are not obtaining the information
that they need to make the best choice.
The Sponsor’s Problem
Medicare Part D is a complicated and ambitious program that was designed to
promote competition between private insurers in the delivery of a prescription
drug benefit while simultaneously addressing the problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection that affect the equity and efficiency of most social insurance
programs. To reduce moral hazard, the program seeks to have enrollees face the
true marginal cost7 of the differences in prices between these prescription drug
plans—while subsidizing the insurance purchases of enrollees at the same time. To
reduce plans’ incentives to select the most profitable (that is, the least costly)
Medicare recipients, Part D provides additional subsidies for those recipients with
high expected costs and with high actual costs. In this section, we discuss more
specifically how Part D influences firm incentives.
From the Bid to the Monthly Premium
Firms interested in sponsoring a stand-alone prescription drug plan must first
decide which of the 34 regions to serve. They must then submit a “bid” to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which represents the amount of
revenue the plan expects to need to provide a typical Part D enrollee with basic
coverage after subtracting expected cost-sharing payments by enrollees and gov-
ernment catastrophic and low-income subsidies. This revenue will cover drug costs,
administrative costs, and a desired profit margin. The sponsor of an enhanced plan
must submit a bid that covers only the costs of running the “basic” aspects of the
plan, and not the costs of the enhanced features. The federal government is
permitted to review each bid to ensure it is reasonable and negotiate with the plan
sponsor if deemed otherwise.
There are a number of steps from the plan bid to the calculation of the actual
monthly premium. Once all bids are approved, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services calculates a “national average bid,” weighted by each plan’s share
of the total population enrolled in Part D. Bids were equally weighted in the first
year of the program to account for the lack of enrollment data. A blended method
7 Of course, part of the variation in premiums across plans will reflect the composition of enrollees.
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was adopted in 2007 and 2008, however, as a statutorily defined calculation would
have produced a national average bid in these years well below the 2006 level and
thus substantially lower subsidies and higher premiums on average.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services then multiplies this national
average bid by a certain percentage that is determined each year (34.7 percent in
2008) to arrive at the “base beneficiary premium.”8 In 2008, the national average
bid and the base beneficiary premium were $80.52 and $27.93 per month, respec-
tively. This base beneficiary premium is then modified to obtain the actual amount
that enrollees pay each month. If a plan had bid $100.52—that is, $20 more than
the average plan—its actual monthly premium would be $20 more than the base
premium, or $47.93. Likewise, if a plan bid $20 below the average, the premium for
that plan would be only $7.93 (premiums cannot fall below zero). This causes the
enrollee to bear the full cost on the margin of selecting a more or less generous
plan, which is an important design feature of Part D.
A firm does not have the incentive to place a bid below its expected costs,
because it will be reimbursed from all sources only up to its bid. Thus, underbid-
ding will simply cause the plan to lose money that year. Conversely, a bid above
costs will earn the plan a higher profit margin per enrollee, but the plan risks losing
market share due to its higher premium.
Policies to Minimize Risk Selection
When designing Medicare Part D, policymakers knew that the program would
be unlikely to succeed if competition among insurers revolved around attracting
healthy enrollees and avoiding costly ones. Relative to all recipients in Part D, those
with three or more chronic conditions consume 25 percent more prescription
drugs on average and are 40 percent more likely to spend over $300 per month
procuring them (Neuman et al., 2007). This high concentration of outlays means
that a plan sponsor’s return to achieving a favorable risk profile is significant. Thus,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services incorporated various policies to
reduce the returns to such socially wasteful competition.
One of the most important policies for harnessing competition among Part D
plans is risk adjustment. The Part D risk adjustment system adjusts plan payments
for each enrollee by the expected variation in prescription drug spending, using a
combination of demographic and health risk factors. Specifically, the system takes
into account the enrollee’s age, sex, low-income subsidy eligibility, institutional
status (for example, living in a nursing home), and health status. Health is scored
by counting the disease categories the enrollee falls into (based on other Medicare
claims) such as diabetes, heart disease, or arthritis. Each characteristic is scored a
number of points, and a total is created for the enrollee, with higher points
8 The Part D legislation requires that program costs be subsidized 74.5 percent by the federal govern-
ment with 25.5 percent paid by enrollees who do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Since most costs
above the catastrophic threshold are covered by federal subsidies, enrollees are responsible for more
than 25.5 percent of the bid amount in order to pay 25.5 percent of total costs.
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measuring higher projected costs. Some points are additive (like those for diseases)
and some multiplicative (for example, being eligible for a low-income subsidy
multiplies the point total by 1.08).
Table 4 illustrates the risk adjustment calculation for a hypothetical 75 year-old
woman with diabetes and hypertension who is eligible for full Medicaid benefits,
using the risk factors in effect for 2006 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2005; adapted from Merlis, 2007). The age/sex and disease factors are
aggregated to give a preliminary risk factor of 0.8466, which is then multiplied by
the low-income factor for full-benefit Medicaid eligibles (1.08) to result in a final
risk factor of 0.9143. The net government subsidy is the bid times the risk adjust-
ment factor less the premium the enrollee pays. Notice that each enrollee pays a
premium that is not adjusted for that enrollee’s own risk. After this process, the
plan’s bid should reflect its expected cost of an enrollee with a risk factor of 1.000,
thereby protecting it from the need to calculate the distributions of risk in the
population or to forecast what distribution it might draw.
The success of the risk adjustment system depends on its ability to capture
enough of the predictable variation in per-enrollee outlays through adjustment of
the federal subsidy to make expenditures on risk selection unprofitable. Currently,
the system offsets approximately one-quarter of the variance in prescription drug
spending per year among the elderly, but could offset at least half if past prescrip-
tion drug usage were included in the formula (Wrobel, Doshi, Stuart, and Briesa-
cher, 2003). This limited risk adjustment is a weakness in Part D. After the first year
of operation, prescription drug plans presumably knew more than the government
about expected costs for their enrollees. As more data accumulates, some plans may
attempt to select enrollees advantageously. Government statisticians who create the
risk factors will try to keep up—but the plans will have better data.
Another important way in which Part D reduces plans’ incentives to select the
healthiest patients is through an 80 percent subsidy for all costs above the cata-
Table 4
Sample Risk Adjustment Calculation for
Hypothetical Enrollee
(75 year-old woman with diabetes and hypertension;
using 2006 risk factors)
Age/sex factor:
Female, 75-79 0.4343
Disease factors:
Diabetes without complication 0.1898
Hypertensive heart disease or hypertension 0.2225
Sum of factors 0.8466
x Low-income multiplier 1.08
Final factor 0.9143
Source: Merlis (2007, table 5).
Note: See text for details.
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strophic threshold, which will reduce the costs to the plan of enrolling an especially
sick beneficiary.
Risks of Participating in a New Industry
Plan sponsors faced considerable business risk in the first few years of Part D
given the complexity of the program and the difficulty in forecasting the number
and the average characteristics of their enrollees. To address this issue, the federal
government shares in each plan’s overall profits or losses if they fall outside of
specific “risk corridors.”
To determine this, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services first
calculates a target drug expenditure for each plan, equal to the sum of federal
subsidies and enrollee premiums less administrative costs. If the plan’s total spend-
ing for standard drug benefits diverges from the target by 5 percent or more, the
government shares the loss or gain. In the case of a 5 to 10 percent deviation, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services pays half of the loss or recoups half of
the gain. If the difference is more than 10 percent, Medicare absorbs 80 percent of
the loss or gain.
Prescription drug plans are also allowed to develop a specialty tier containing
very expensive unique and injectable drugs, such as genomic and biotech products,
with freedom from the normal rules governing formulary tier exceptions, and to
maintain high enrollee cost sharing at or actuarially equal to 25 percent coinsur-
ance before the initial coverage limit. By mandating a sustained contribution rate
by the enrollee, this decision protects plans from the risk of bearing a significant
share of specialty drug spending.
With these rules in place, Part D plans currently face limited uncertainty about
their costs. The government both insures plans (paying 80 percent of costs above
a threshold) for the risk that certain individuals are very expensive to insure and for
the aggregate risk that their populations are expensive to insure (again paying
80 percent of costs above a threshold). These rules have helped to encourage
private-sector participation in the early years of the plan. However, while both types
of subsidies reduce plan risk, they also reduce incentives to operate efficiently and
to control costs.
Can Part D Plans Influence Pharmaceutical Prices?
The designers of Part D hoped that competition would hold down the pro-
gram costs: in particular, they envisioned an intertwined pattern of competition
involving both drug manufacturers and insurance plans. One important dimension
of this vision was competition between drug manufacturers for preferred placement
of its products on each plans’ formulary. Typically, whichever drug manu-
facturer— out of those producing therapeutic substitutes— offers the lowest
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(quality-adjusted) price to an insurance plan gets preferential placement for its
product, while its competitors lose sales. Manufacturers can offer discounts for
particular formulary placement (having a certain drug on a preferred tier) or
exclusive formulary placement (for example, being the only statin on a preferred
tier). Manufacturers can also offer greater discounts for higher realized market
share: for example, the manufacturer could offer an additional 10 percent price
reduction for 40 percent market share in the class.
Designing incentives and procedures that allow the plan to move market share
in a way that is acceptable to enrollees and physicians is a valuable skill for a
prescription drug plan. The more effectively a plan moves market share for favored
products—either due to formulary design, utilization management techniques,
bigger differences between preferred and nonpreferred brands, better rules for
usage of expensive drugs, or other rules—the lower its cost of acquiring drugs will
be relative to other plans.
However, moving market share is difficult for a prescription drug plan. After
all, physicians typically see dozens of patients who belong to many different plans,
and the physicians cannot possibly keep track of all the associated formularies. For
this reason, the plans typically focus on providing incentives to the patient and the
pharmacist. The hope is that a patient taking a nonpreferred drug might ask her
physician about alternative drugs that are less expensive, or the pharmacist might
suggest alternatives since the pharmacist can see the formulary rules and under-
stands both prices and substitutability. The plan might additionally ensure the
pharmacy earns a higher profit from dispensing the preferred drug.
Recent research suggests that Part D consumers are likely to respond to
demand-side incentives aimed at moving market share. Chandra, Gruber, and
McKnight (2007) analyzed a policy change that raised cost sharing for retired
public employees in California and found the sample population to be quite price
elastic in their demand for all types of drugs, including those that control acute
life-threatening and chronic conditions. The implied price elasticities appear to
greatly exceed those observed in the famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
suggesting that prescription drug plans could steer their enrollees’ demand using
financial incentives.
Duggan and Scott Morton (2008) examine the question of whether the pre-
scription drug plans are elastic demanders by analyzing national price and quantity
data for a sample of more than 500 large-sales branded drugs that have varying
levels of sales to elderly Americans. The paper exploits variation across drugs in the
pre-Part D “Medicare market share” to investigate the effect of the program on the
average price and utilization of branded treatments. They find that Part D caused
a significant decline in average pharmaceutical prices, relative to the market trend.
The magnitude of the effect is substantial, with a lower bound of 13 percent. This
result suggests that moving consumers from standard cash-paying status into a
prescription drug plan with an active formulary has an economically meaningful
impact on drug prices.
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When There are Fewer Therapeutic Substitutes
A prescription drug plan has the most leverage to steer demand toward
products on which price concessions are offered when there is potential competi-
tion. However, the first drugs to be developed in a new class of drugs and those that
offer unique therapeutic advantages for elderly users may present a financial
problem for Part D. The monopoly power these types of drugs enjoy, combined
with insurance that covers a high percentage of the consumer’s cost, means that
manufacturers of such products are in a position to set a price higher than a
monopolist selling to an uninsured market, and still sell the same quantity (Frank
and Newhouse, 2007). This feature of Part D is likely to receive scrutiny if, when the
next breakthrough drug arrives on the market, its price is high. Prescription drug
plans may then be required to place it on their formularies and set a copayment.
A similar problem is present if there are just one or two treatments in an existing
class given that plans would usually be required to include both on their formu-
laries.
A second issue is that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services requires
plans to cover at least two drugs in every therapeutic class and “all or substantially
all” drugs in six “protected classes.”9 These protected classes are immunosuppres-
sants, antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, HIV antiretrovirals, and an-
tineoplastics (cancer). Moreover, plans cannot use utilization management tech-
niques (like requirements for prior authorization or step therapy) on beneficiaries
stabilized on a drug regimen in one or more of these six categories prior to
enrollment in Part D, unless they can demonstrate extraordinary circumstances.
Plans may however, use these techniques to manage therapy for beneficiaries who
begin treatment with drugs in these categories other than antiretrovirals. By remov-
ing the ability to exclude or manage certain drugs, these rules remove some of the
plan’s ability to shift market share and therefore obtain low prices. Additionally,
loosely speaking, drugs in these six categories tend to be weaker substitutes for one
another than the “average” drug. For example, a person often develops resistance
to an HIV drug over time, and some tumors respond to some chemotherapy drugs
and not others. Thus, we might expect that the prescription drug plan will be less
able to use its tools to obtain low prices in these classes than in others.
Duggan and Scott Morton (2008), shed some light on this potential problem
also. They find that brands with few therapeutic substitutes and high sales to Part
D eligibles do not experience the price decline relative to trend evidenced by drugs
with several substitutes, indicating that the role of a plan’s formulary in stimulating
competition and lowering prices is important. One might expect the same pattern
9 The two-drug requirement does not apply when only one drug is available for a particular category or
class, or when only two drugs are available and one is clinically superior. “Substantially all” means that
all drugs in the protected classes are expected to be included in plan formularies, with exceptions for
multi-source brands of identical molecular structure, extended release products when an immediate-
release product is included, products that have the same active ingredient, and dosage forms that do not
provide a unique route of administration.
84 Journal of Economic Perspectives
for protected classes given that all drugs in these categories must be covered, and
indeed the authors’ estimates are qualitatively similar but statistically insignificant.
Role of Search
Copayments will differ substantially across plans both for long-term mainte-
nance drugs and for curative, acute-care drugs, as will be discussed below. Con-
sumers can easily search for the lowest out-of-pocket cost plan that offers a partic-
ular set of drugs by using the Plan Finder, whereas many acute-care drugs are
consumed with little advance warning. Thus, we might expect that prescription
drug plans work harder to obtain low prices on maintenance medications than
others. There is currently little evidence on this point for Part D plans, though
previous evidence on retail price dispersion across pharmacies is consistent with
this (Sorenson, 2000).
To investigate this issue, we collected evidence on a sample of 821 drugs in the
California region in May 2007, using the Plan Finder website: 569 brand-name and
253 generic. The sample included the top-selling drugs in therapeutic categories
with a high concentration of spending by the elderly, based on the 2004 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey. We collected evidence on both acute-care and mainte-
nance drugs. We found that for brand-name drugs, the average price of acute-care
drugs from the preferred network pharmacy was $491, while the average price of
maintenance drugs was $114. However, when looking at generic drugs, essentially
no price difference existed between acute-care and maintenance drugs. Of course,
this finding is far from conclusive as it could be driven by the nature of the classes
of drugs in each group. This question remains an important area for future
research.
Enrollees without Financial Incentives
Prescription drug plans serve many enrollees for whom it is difficult to provide
incentives to move market share. Medicare Part D replaced Medicaid as the primary
source of prescription drug coverage for enrollees eligible for both programs,
individuals known as “dual eligibles.” “Duals” are eligible for Medicare because they
are elderly or on the Social Security Disability Insurance program, and eligible for
Medicaid because they are sufficiently poor. Table 5 provides enrollment informa-
tion for Medicare beneficiaries with prescription drug coverage in Part D, including
information on insurance from other sources. Unless a Medicare recipient who was
also eligible for Medicaid made an active choice, that recipient was randomly
assigned to one of the low-cost plans in the relevant region. The premium paid by
the dual eligible would be zero for any plan with a premium at or below the
enrollment-weighted regional average. If such a dual eligible enrollee wanted to
choose a more expensive plan, the enrollee would pay the difference between that
plan’s premium and the lesser of the regional average premium or the amount of
the plan’s premium attributable to basic benefits.
Beneficiaries with incomes below 150 percent of poverty ($15,600 for individ-
uals; $21,000 for couples in 2008) and modest assets ($11,990 for individuals;
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$23,970 for couples) receive assistance in several ways. All recipients of the low-
income subsidy have a zero or reduced deductible and face smaller copayments or
coinsurance. Moreover, there is no coverage gap; instead, enrollees continue with
cost sharing until they reach the out-of-pocket threshold. “Full subsidy” enrollees,
including duals, pay no premium, have very low copayments for drugs below the
catastrophic threshold ($1.05 for generics or preferred drugs, or $3 all others), and
pay nothing for expenditures above the catastrophic threshold. “Partial subsidy”
enrollees face standard cost sharing during catastrophic coverage and a reduced
premium phased out on a sliding-scale basis. Dual eligibles account for half of those
Table 5
Medicare Beneficiaries with Prescription Drug Coverage,
2008
Description
Beneficiaries
(millions)
Medicare beneficiaries eligible for Part D 44.20
Medicare Part D 25.40
Stand-alone prescription drug plan
Non-dual-eligiblesa 12.09 (2.6)
Dual-eligibles 5.30
Medicare Advantage with Drug Coverageb
Non-dual-eligiblesa 6.71 (.15)
Dual-eligibles 1.30
Medicare retiree drug subsidy (RDS) 6.66
Other drug coverage 7.53
TRICARE retiree coverage 0.90
FEHBP retiree coverage 1.05
Veterans Affairs (VA) coverage 1.59
Active workers with Medicare secondary payer 1.20
Other retiree coverage, not enrolled in RDS 1.54
State pharmaceutical assistance programs 0.02
Indian Health Service coverage 0.03
Medigap and other individual insurance 0.21
Multiple sources of creditable coveragec 0.69
Other sourcesd 0.30
Total Medicare beneficiaries with drug coverage 39.59
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ 2008 Enrollment Infor-
mation, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn.
Note: Dual eligibles are entitled to both Medicare Part D and Medicaid.
FEHBP is Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. TRICARE is the
managed care component of the United States Department of Defense
Military Health System.
a Parentheses denotes number of non-dual-eligibles receiving the low-
income subsidy.
b Includes beneficiaries enrolled in other Medicare health plan types with
prescription drug coverage (.38 million in 2008): Demo; 1876/1833 Cost;
Program of All Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE); chronic care pilots.
c Includes beneficiaries with more than one of the following: TRICARE,
FEHBP, VA, or Medicare as secondary payer.
d Includes FEHBP spouses and dependents.
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eligible for the low-income subsidy and one-fourth of all beneficiaries enrolled in
Part D.
Since Part D enrollees with low-income subsidies pay little or nothing in terms
of cost sharing, their utilization cannot easily be controlled through demand-side
financial incentives. Instead, plans might seek to influence their choices through
requirements for prior authorization for certain drugs, step therapy, or a more
restrictive formulary.
How Subsidies Reduce Incentives to Create Competition
Dual eligibles are on average in worse health and thus more expensive to
insure compared to the average Medicare recipient. They are also more likely to
suffer from cognitive impairment and psychoses, and they have higher rates of
significant chronic illnesses such as HIV/AIDS, diabetes, pulmonary disease, stroke,
and Alzheimer’s. Total healthcare spending—which includes Medicare, Medicaid,
supplemental insurance, and out-of-pocket spending across all payers—for duals
averaged about $23,554 per person in 2005, more than twice the amount for all
other Medicare beneficiaries (MedPAC, 2007a).
Recall that a prescription drug plan is subsidized 80 percent for expenditures
on enrollees who exceed the catastrophic threshold. The high rates of subsidy for
the plan significantly dampen the plan’s incentives to put maximal pricing pressure
on manufacturers given that each additional dollar of spending is paid primarily by
Medicare, not the plan or the patient. This illustrates the tradeoff between reduc-
ing the incentive to select healthy patients (adverse selection) and increasing the
incentive to seek low prices (cost containment).
Issues Going Forward
Formulary Manipulation?
The role of adverse selection in Medicare Part D is complex because of the
variety of subsidies plans receive for the very sick. But broadly speaking, any plan
offering more generous coverage is at risk of attracting the sicker enrollees, who
will tend to be unprofitable. For example, it was widely reported that enhanced
plans that offered brand coverage in the doughnut hole in 2006 attracted expensive
enrollees, and virtually all eliminated that feature for 2008 (Alonso-Zaldivar, 2006).
On the other hand, a plan that enrolls Medicare recipients with expenditures below
the deductible or with relatively low spending and charges these recipients a
positive premium will make profits.
One way for plans to attract healthier patients is to select their formularies with
care. For example, if plans were allowed to restrict their coverage in classes of drugs
differentially consumed by high-cost beneficiaries, they could use this tool to
“cream-skim” a relatively high number of low-cost patients. However, one study of
2006 plan formularies did not find a pattern of more restrictive coverage in plans
eligible to those with low-income subsidies. Indeed, the median number of drugs
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listed by plans available to those with low-income subsidies was slightly greater than
that for basic plans overall (MedPAC, 2007a). Another study of plan formularies
available to those with low-income subsidies in three prescription drug plan regions
found the least generous formulary covers between 72 and 77 of the top 100 most
commonly used drugs by duals, while the median plan covers just over 90 drugs,
with the vast majority of these drugs placed on preferred tiers (MedPAC, 2007b).
Moreover, plans have not been complaining about how expensive the dual popu-
lation is to cover, which leads us to believe that the government subsidy is causing
duals to be either neutral or profitable for plans. Based on this limited evidence
from the first few years of the program, we are provisionally concluding that the
adverse selection issue appears not to be a significant problem at present.
Of course, one powerful reason why formularies are not being manipulated in
this way may be the government oversight of formulary choices. The government
imposes minimum formulary requirements and also provides a safe harbor for
plans that utilize a therapeutic classification system consistent with guidelines
published by the United States Pharmacopeia (an independent organization which
serves as the official agency for setting standards on quality and classification of
drugs). In addition, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has the
authority to review the specific drugs, tiering, and utilization management strate-
gies employed in each Part D plan formulary to ensure that they are not designed
to drive away enrollees with particular conditions.
The current structure of Part D will likely perpetuate the need for continued
scrutiny of plan formularies. Even if the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services designs a risk adjustment system that more accurately predicts costs, it
cannot totally eliminate the incentives of prescription drug plans to design their
formularies to discourage enrollment of beneficiaries with high expected levels of
prescription drug spending or encourage plan termination by enrollees with high
actual costs.
A Handout for the Drug Companies?
Given that Part D is now subsidizing the cost of medications for Medicare
recipients by 75 percent, it is perhaps not surprising that utilization of drugs in this
group has increased. For example, Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) and Yin et al.
(2007) investigate the effect of Part D on out-of-pocket costs and drug utilization
with data on prescriptions filled by Walgreen’s during the period from late 2004 to
early 2007. Both studies estimate that Part D reduced the out-of-pocket costs of
drugs consumed by the elderly and led to a sizeable increase in utilization.
A 2007 analysis commissioned by Pharma (2007) looked at the impact of Part
D on patient out-of-pocket costs and utilization for the previously uninsured. For
this study, pharmacy transaction records from Verispan (a major provider of
patient-centric, longitudinal healthcare data) were obtained for all patients age 65
and older for the period January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2006. The study
found that the average number of prescriptions filled each month for the previ-
ously uninsured almost doubled, with patients eligible for low-income subsidies
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experiencing larger increases. Out-of-pocket cost savings were also sizeable, with
the cost per day of supply falling by 69 percent.
In combination with the finding of lower prices in Duggan and Scott Morton
(2008), this suggests Part D is providing more drugs at lower prices to Medicare
recipients. Since the marginal costs of drugs are very low, this is in certain respects
a socially efficient change. (Of course, a full welfare calculation would need to
account for factors like the deadweight loss associated with the tax revenue raised
and the effect on firms’ innovation incentives.) In any case, it appears that at least
in 2006 and 2007, concerns about the Part D program being mainly a handout to
the pharmaceutical industry have not been realized.
From a broader point of view, the issue is not only how Part D affects drug
spending, but also how it affects overall healthcare spending. Because stand-alone
prescription drug plans are not vertically integrated healthcare providers like the
Medicare Advantage plans described above, inefficient treatment patterns that save
on drug costs but increase other healthcare costs might be encouraged by the
stand-alone plans (Goldman and Joyce, 2008). In contrast, a Medicare Advantage
drug plan would be willing to spend more on the pharmacy benefit if it reduced
subsequent medical costs by more. Therefore, a stand-alone prescription drug plan
may be a less efficient way to deliver a pharmacy benefit when considering health-
care costs as a whole. This issue suggests an important direction for future research.
Too Confusing?
The results from recent research suggest that most of the 4.6 million Medicare
recipients without prescription drug coverage would benefit from enrollment in
Part D (Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2007). The complexity of the program is one
possible reason that these individuals are choosing not to enroll. Research by these
same authors and by Kling, Mullainathan, Shafir, Vermeulen, and Wrobel (2008)
further indicates that relatively many Part D recipients are making suboptimal plan
choices, causing them to spend more out of pocket than is necessary. The com-
plexity of the choice problem they face could be driving these poor choices, which
strongly suggests that simplification of the choice-set and increased outreach to
Medicare recipients by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and other
organizations would save Medicare recipients time and money (Hoadley, 2008).
Even without more simplification or outreach, it seems plausible that Medicare
recipients will make better choices as they accumulate more experience with Part
D. For example, in the first year of the program, the Kling et al. study found that
Medicare recipients paid much more attention to the monthly premium than to
the (less transparent) out-of-pocket costs for their current and potential future
drugs. A year or two of experience with Part D may increase the salience of the
cost-sharing arrangements for each drug and allow Medicare recipients both to
reduce their out-of-pocket expenditures and to choose a formulary more tailored
to their own healthcare needs.
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The Effect on the Federal Budget
Even prior to the enactment of Medicare Part D, federal spending on health
care was increasing significantly more rapidly than GDP and was creating a strain
on the federal budget. For example, from 2000 to 2005, inflation-adjusted spending
by the federal government on Medicare increased by 5.4 percent per year versus
real GDP growth of just 2.3 percent per year. This difference accelerated in 2006
with the introduction of Part D, with Medicare spending increasing by 15.0 percent
in just one year to reach $354 billion (Medicare Trustees, 2008). The Congressional
Budget Office (2007) forecasts that Medicare spending as a fraction of GDP will
more than double in the next two decades as per capita healthcare costs continue
to outpace income growth and as the baby boom generation ages. This expenditure
growth will arguably represent the most important challenge in domestic policy-
making in the decades ahead. Thus while the addition of Part D may have improved
the quality of health care for Medicare recipients, it has substantially worsened the
outlook for the federal budget.
Conclusion
We view the first two and a half years of operation for Medicare Part D as
relatively successful overall, given the challenges involved. The market for Part D
plans has spawned many options for consumers and the fraction of Medicare
recipients with prescription drug coverage has increased substantially. Competition
among plans is driving premiums down to levels lower-than-anticipated by policy-
makers and sponsors. The prices that plans pay to manufacturers for branded drugs
are on average lower than the prices the manufacturers were receiving before the
program, and utilization of these treatments has increased.
However, important concerns remain about the program going forward.
Recent research strongly suggests that many Medicare recipients are making sub-
optimal choices, either by not enrolling in Part D or by choosing a suboptimal plan.
Additionally, while the program has on average reduced pharmaceutical prices, it
has possibly increased prices for treatments without good substitutes. Another
concern is that, as plans accumulate more information on utilization by their own
enrollees, they may shift their formularies to discourage re-enrollment by the least
profitable patients. The creation of this program has substantially worsened the
long-term fiscal outlook for the federal government, with overall Medicare spend-
ing approximately ten percent greater overall than it would be without Part D.
Finally, the administrative expenses (including sales costs and plan profits) of the
Part D program are almost six times higher than the administrative expenses of
traditional Medicare, so this program is very expensive to administer (Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, 2007).
A number of questions about Part D remain unanswered and represent
important topics for future research. Perhaps most importantly, there is scant
evidence regarding the effect of Part D on the health or medical expenditure risk
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of Medicare recipients. Additionally, more evidence is needed regarding the de-
terminants of Part D enrollment and the selection of a Part D plan. Is the
complexity of Part D the main reason for the suboptimal choices or are there other
reasons as well? This information would be useful to policymakers as they consider
which interventions to launch to help Medicare recipients optimize in this compli-
cated choice environment.
y We are grateful to Jim Hines, Jeremy Stein, and Timothy Taylor for very helpful comments
on an earlier draft. Duggan and Scott Morton also thank the National Science Foundation
for supporting this research.
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